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My assignment  fot  this  Conference  on  the  Crlais  ln  Blnance, 
understand  it  , 
debt  experience 
is  in  the  first  instance  to  bring  to  baa; 
of  the  Great  Depremion  of  1929/X940.  _ 
sunmar~se  first  the  record  as  shown  in  a  Twentieth  Ccnturry Fund 
report,  which  I  prepared  in  1938 for  the  Fund’s  Committee  on  Debt 
AdjWtment.1  \ 
This  report  already  contained  a  good  deal  of  hfndslght, 
since  it  was  written  flvs  years  after  the  end  of  the  recession  of 
1929/33.  But  the  process  of  reconstruction  is  also  relevant  to 
present-day  problems.  -in  particular,  the  New Deal  reforms  in  the 
debt  field  set  the  pattern  of  law  and  financial  customs  within 
which  the  forces  of  finance  have  been  operating  in  recent 
decades. 
Parallels  and  contrasts  between  the  debt  situations  of 
1928/1930 and  of  1988/90 are  next  examined.  After some 
institutional  anslysis,  quantitative  exanination  of  changes 
through  time  (1966/1989)  is  undertaken,  using  a  8et  of  tables 
I  reproduced  in  the  ANnEXI  on  the  balance-sheet  history  of 
households  and  of  non-financial corporations. 
In  the  light  of  all  thi8  experience,  I  make  a  quick 
excursion  into  the  field  of  financial  reform.  It  is  not  ray 
business  on  this  occasion  to  spell  out  the  policy  alternatives. 
But  we  must  ask  whether  basic  reform  may not  be  needed  to  keep 
debt problems  from  plaguing  us  year  after  year-  and  also whether 
attempts  at  refoznr  my  themselves  bring  the  crisis  to  a  head! 
It  turns  out  that  the  issee  of  reform  in  a  crisis-context 
hinges  on  whether  the  United  states  can  quickly  set  in  motion  a 
MjOZ  new  industry  to  act  as an economic  ~locomotfvew.  I  claim 
that  this  1s  feasible--  the  “new  industry”  heing  m,on  qpP 
zastructurina  of  the  V  S.  w  To  g8t  it  in  motion 
calls  for  a  revival  of’fiscal  policy  aloig  radical  new  lines. 
1  Albert G. Hart, Debts and Recovery, 1929 to 1937.  New 
York, 1938, Twentieth Century Fund.  In later footnotes this 
publication is referred to as "D&R'*. r.  t  t  e  0 
.  A  look  the  way  the  debt  situation  stood  before  and  during 
the  Orart  Depression  of  the  1930’s  will  both  give  a  starting- 
point  for  my  paper  and  offer  some  warnings  about  professional 
fallibility, 
Debt  DroblemtI  as  neweived  in  1938 
When  in  1938  the.  Twentieth  Cerntury  Fund  published  its 
report  on  the  U.S.  debt  picture  for  the  period  of  the  great 
depression,  2  the  Fund’s  Comeaittee  on  Debt  Adjustment  (and  the 
Fund’s  editors)  wanted  a  single  figure  to  measure  the  ntotal 
amount  of  outstanding  debts  in  the  United  States”,  With  great 
reluctance,  I  produced  such  a  figure  for  1929  and  also  fox  1937-- 
in  each  case  Well  in  excess  of  $250  billion@.  Since  US 
national  income  was  $84.7  million  in  1929  and  $72.2  billion  in 
1937,  it  wan easy  to  suggest  that  debts  were  unduly  high. 
n  E 
Major  components  of  the  1929  aggregate  of  $250  billion  were: 
a)  $53  billion  of  short-term  debts  receivable  at  banks 
and  at  non-financial  corporations, 
b)  $47  billion  of  corporate  bonded  debt, 
c)  $47  billion  of  bank  deposits, 
81  $40  billion  of  mortgages, 
e)  $17  billion  of  federal  qovenment  debt, 
f)  $17  billion  of  state-and-local  government  debt, 
g)  $14  billion  of  deposits  and  Wshazesn  in  savings 
institutions. 
h1  812  billion  In  life-insurance  reserves. 
3 The  laverincr  of 
To  add together  this jumble of figure8 wa% essentially 
meaningleas,  Items  (a), tb) and  (d) may be regarded  a8  "prianary 
debt*,  re8tinq on a bottom  layer which consists  of the  value  of 
land  and buildings and the going-concern  value  (including a good 
deal of what  is now  Called  "human Capitaln)  linked to  private 
\ 
enterpzise8. 
Xtem8  CC),  (g)  and  (h) represent  a  distinct  layer of 
uPon-clairag.  Adding  this group to the primary-debt  group 
and the government-debt  group  --items  (e)  and  (f)-- involves 
double-counting. 
It would have been aor  meaningful to 8um up  in  term  of  a 
cliche of  classicerl  economics:  ;Sie  every  de-bt  ha8 two  end8  -- 
debtorshfo  and  crcditorshio  _- the  total cencels  out  to zero when 
WI  e  or the differen  e 
between  debt8 to and from the Vest  of the world". 
pebt  8tudY.b~  secw 
The data  actually  examined  In  the  debt.  report  were  mu.ch  more 
meaningful  than  any  mere  w3u8b  total*.  successive  chapters 
examined  the  debt positions  of sectors of  the economy:  credit 
institutions  in the  large,  commercial  banks,  non-bank  credit 
institutions;  individual8  and  unincorporated  firms;  corporate 
bUbint88,  and governments. 
Sector  by sector,  X searched  for weak spots--  by examination 
of events  from 1929  onward,  study  of  documents  (such  as  a  New 
York  State report on  private  mortgage-guarantee  companies),  and 
weighing  of  institutional  evidence  as  to  the terms  of  debt 
contracts  and the custom8  and attitude8  of creditors  and debtors. 
Numerical  data  were  exhibited  in  58  well-annotated  appendix 
tables. 
4 Qiaunosiq_.fgom  the evidence 
This  evidence,  I held,  did  sshow  definitely  that  large 
sectors  of the debt  structure  were bound to give way within  a few 
yearn, even without being pushed by a prior decline  in business". 
I  instanced  debts  of  gUaYant8ed-mortgage  commni88  without 
capital,'  bonds  of  railroads  faced  with  truck  competition, 
mortgages  of  "properties  .  .  .  carried  on  a  sho8stringW,  and 
security  loans in a Vop-heavy  stock marketH. 
I seem to have  ducked  the question  whether  in  the  absence 
of  a  general  recession  there  would  be  a  simultaneous  collapse  of 
SeVeral  vulnerable sectors.  If  the answer  were *probably  not", 
the  danger  presented  by such sectors  would  have, to be seen  as 
much  less  acute. 
On  the  broad  situation,  I took the position  that: 
*  ..* if the history of  the years before 1939 is 
evidence, major debt difficulties  can leave 
prosperity unshaken  so long as othsr  conditions 
are  not  unfavorable. 
"Once business  had turned  downward,  however, 
there  is  little  zoom  for  doubt  that  dabt 
were  among the chief  influences which made the 
situation grow cumulatively  worse."2 
I would take more satisfaction  in having  held this position  if I 
had  actually  carried  out  a careful  scrutiny  of  the  "history 
before  1929", to see when there had been major debt difficulties 
QJ& followed by serious recessions.  Unfortunately,  X find that of 
the 50 tables dealing with  private  debts  in the appendix  to  the 
debt report, only 41  are  historical--  and  only  7  of  these  give 
data  for  2  or  more year8 prior to 19291 
2. ,D&R,,pp.  7-8. A longer 
sentei;ncecl  quoted  here,  is 
paper  l 
qu.atati,on,  framing the two 
part of ths ANNEX to this 
5 But  I  would  dill  describe  the  first  of  my two assertions  as 
a  sensible  horseback  opinion, and  the second as  a  finding  well 
warranted  by  the  facts  about  the transportation and  real estate 
indu8tries  and  by  the  record  of  some  sectors  of  finance  (above 
all  building-and-loan  asaociations.and  brokers). 
P.avina for  dead  w 
An  imortant  way  in  which  debt  problems  helped  intensify  the 
great  recession  of  1929/1933  was  only  hinted  at  in the  report 
(because  Keynesian  ideas  had  not  been  fully  assimilated  by 
19383).  This  was  the  pressure  upon  debtors  to  continue  debt 
repayments  even  though  the  assets  for  which  they  went  into  debt 
had  been  taken  over  by  creditors.  A  stock  speculator  whose 
account  had  been  closed  out  at  a  loss,  for  example,  still  had  to 
make  repayments  to  his  broker--  or  more  likely  to  the  bank  which 
had  taken  over  assets  when  the  broker  went  broke,  or  to  the 
receiver  for  the bank--  if  he  still  had  salary  income. 
Anybody  who  was  thus  “paying  for  a  dead  horse”  was  eubjected 
to  fotced  saving.  He  was  barred  front  doing  what  K8yneSianS  came 
to  feel  was  natural:  taking  more,  of  any  drop  of  earnings  out  of 
saving  and  less  out  of  consumption. 
As  may  be  seen  from  Table  TSD  in  the  Annex,  personal  saving 
dtopped  in  the  recession  years  1930-1933  by  about  109  as  much  as 
personal disposable  income  dropped.  In  the  recovery  years  1934- 
1936,  however,  personal  saving  rose  by  over  20%  as  much  as 
disposable  income.  Without the  dead-horse  effect,  a  quarter  or  a 
fifth  of  the  income  drop  could  have  come  out  of  saving.  Thus  an 
important  *automatic  stabilizerm  tending  to  abate  the  cuxuulative 
effect  of  reces8ion  seems  to  have been much weakened  during the 
downswing of  the great depression. The  -1937-38  recesm 
Another  point  at  which  the  1938  report  now  looks  inadequate 
was  the  analysis  of  the  “depression  within  a  depressionW  which 
had  just  passed  its  trough  when  the  report  went  to  press,  The  New 
Deal  had  brought  us  not  so  much  a  full  economic  recovery  as  a  way 
to  live  with  a  fairly  deep  depression.  At  the  1937  peak,  (as  we  \ 
were  told  by  a  Brookings  study  of  ~me  c  1  Q  duce, 
which  is  well  confirmed  by  highsight),  the  United  States  was 
producing  at  about  80%  of  potential.  Although  effective  capacity 
had  grown  substantially,  actual  constant-dollar  output  in  1937 
was  about  the  same  as  8  years  earlier. 
The  sharp  drop  of  activity  and  employment  in  1937-38  showed 
once  again  (like  British  and  German  experience  from  1923  to  1931) 
that  to  be  in  a  depression  is  no  guarantee  against  falling  into  a 
WOlfdC  depxass  ion.  It  was  generally  believed  at  the  time--  and 
still  scemb  plausible  today--  that  the  U.S.  setback  of  1937-38 
*resulted  from  a  shift  toward  tight  money  by  the  Federal  Reserve 
in  1937.  Many  of  us  were  saying  at  that  time:  Well,  so  this  is 
what  prosperity  is  like  these  days!”  And  a  price  rise  which  in 
the  postwar  would  seem  trifling  was  enough  to  persuade  policy- 
makers  and  many  observers  of  the  economy  that  it  was  time  to  act 
against  inflation. 
An  oddity  of  the  1937  situation  was  that  the  economic  impact 
of  the  new  Social  Security  program  was  not  brought  into  focus. 
Employer  contributions  for  social  insurance  are  reported  in  the 
national  accounts  at  about  $0.2  billion  for  each  year  in  1931/35. 
They  jumped  to  $0.5  billion  (0.7%  of  DFI)  in  1936  and  to  $1.3 
billion  (1.8%)  in  1937. 
The  rate  of  rise  of  the  implicit  deflator  for  personal 
consumption  expenditures  was  2.5%  from  1934  to  1935,  1.2%  from 
1935  to  1936  and  3.6%  from  1936  to  1937.  Since  employer 
contributions  dx iv@  a  wedge  between  wages  received  by  employees 
and  labor  costs  paid  by  employers,  the  scheduled  contrlbution- 
7 change  was  equivalent  to  a  non-recurrent  inflationary  lump of 
about  2% acxoss  the two  years 1936/37,  accounting  for  a good 
slice  of  the  price  rise  of  4.8% which  the consumption  deflator 
indicates. 
One  might  have  thought  the  Federal  Reserve  could  have  waited 
a  little  before  deciding  it  was  approriate  to  impair  the  position 
of  debtors  by  imposing  tight  monty.  Yet  neither  my  text  h 
\ 
the 
report  nor  the  final  chapter  of  “Findings  and  Recommendations  of 
the  Committee  on  Debt  AdJustment*  hinted  that  the  Fad-induced 
rise  of  interest  levels  should  be  challenged  as  a  measure  to 
intensify  debt  problem  by  reducfng  employment  and  income.  The 
Committee  concluded  its  chapter  rather  tamely  with  the  remark 
that  “The  Committee  is  Rmphatically  of  the  Opinion  that  While 
Sounder  Debt  Policies  Can  Help  to  Forestall  Depressions  and  Ease 
Crises  They  Cannot  Alone  Bring  Recovery.m XI.  Debt  D_&&&culties  as  of  1990-95 
Jn  1991,  we  stand  in  a  very  diff8rent  position  than  we  did 
at  the  opening  of  the  great  depreaston.  Looking  at’  au&sectors 
of  the  private  corporate  sector,  we  can  again  see  d88D 
vulnerability  in  transpoxtatlon--  but  this  time  in  airlines  and 
buses.  We can  again  see  weaknesses  in  mortgages--  but  this  time 
of  quite  a  diffarent  type  l  The  njunk  bondW  problem  is  also 
acute--  but  has  no  clearcut  earlier  prototype.  Debts  of  stock 
speculators,  though,  which  were  a  major  weakness  in  1929,  are 
not  an  important  elem8nt  in  the  1990/9l’situation. 
Both  airlinas  and  bus  companies  are  faced  in  the  early 
1990’s  with  over-capacity--  many  more  seats  than  passengers. 
What  has hit the  bus  companies  is  the  corepetition  of  airlines, 
which  for  the  longer  trips  offer  advantages  in  journey-time,  in 
comfort  and  often  in  ticket  price. 
What  has  hit  the  airlines  is  more  commplex.  Large  new  planes 
offer  Op8Zating-COSt  advantages  (reflected  in  high  lease-prices 
and  in  orders  for  new  aircraft).  But  planes  of  older  vintages 
have  prOV8d  surprisingly  durable  and  usable.  Though  difficult  and 
expensive  to  operate  and  maintain  they  can  still  yield  revenues 
that  more  than  cover  operating  costs. 
The  widespread  impression  that  reduced  fares  and  financial 
difficulties  (and  the  demise  of  many  airline&)  arise  from 
d8requlation  seems  to  be  well-founded.  But  almost  nobody  seems  to 
think  that  re-regulation  could  improve  any  aspect  of  the 
situation  except  flight safety  and  delays  at  airports.3 
3  I: note  in  passing  that  there  is  an  elemant  of  market 
failure  in  the  COULs8  of  air  transport.  Advocates  of 
deregulation  have  urged  that  if  ~8  leave  things  to  the  market, 
the  Ww  of  one  price”  will  take  hold  and guarantee  that  all 
comers  will  pay  a  well-known  an4 uniform  price  for  any  stated 
9 firoruase  debts--  backsround 
Mortgage  debt  has  very  different  characteristics  now  than  it 
had  before  the  great  depression.  The  difference  results  from  New 
Deal  financial  reforms,  from  financial  lnnovatlon,  and  from  over- 
optimism  of  real  estate  investors  in  the  1980’s. 
Before  the  great  depression,  a  substantial  proporti.on  of 
mortgages  outstanding  had  been  written  for  stated  terms  of  1 
year,  5  years  or  10  years.  When  the  end  of  the  term  came,  it  was 
common  to  carry  the  mortgage  “open”,  which  meant  that  the 
creditor  could  legally  call  for  payment  at  any  time  (but  was 
ordinarily  expected  to  “go  easy”  on  debtors). 
$mortizatiu 
Amortization,  providing  for  repayent  in  full  by  a  long 
serfcs  of  monthly  payments,  was  the  alternative  to  handling 
mortages  aa  term  01  open  loans.  Amortization  was  rathex  rare 
service. 
What  we  observe  is  quite  different--  a  Chamberlinean 
process  of  “product  differentiation”.  The  airlines  struggle 
to’charqe  high  prices  to  travelers  with  expense  accounts  and 
make  price-cuts  available  only  to  travelers  who  use  their  own 
money.  They  bid  for  the  former  group  by  handing  out  “frequent 
flier”  benefits  to  expense-account  flyers  in  their  personal 
rather  than  in  their  employee  capacity.  Whereas  nfree  market” 
idealogy  indicates  that  the  uniform  market  price  will  be  high 
enough  to  keep  a  slight  margin  of  seats  available  and 
guarantee  that  everybody  can  count  on  using  the  flight  of 
his choice,  definite advance  reservation  ir  made  a  privilege 
that  demands  special  payment. 
The  result,  as  any  travel  agent  can  tell you,  is that 
market-price  information  does  not  reach  many  participants  in 
the  market,  and  that  essentially  identfcal  services  are  sold 
at  differentiated  prices--  to  the  great  disadvantage  of  a 
large  proportion  of  the  market  participants. 
One  suspects  that  similar  price  discrimination  and 
mystffIcation  arc  rife  also  in  the  field  of  financial 
services. 
10 in  moat  groups  of  mortgage  lenders.  At  building  and  loan 
associations,  however,  amortization  haU  been  standard  practice 
for  dccadcs--  but  in  a  form  which  caused  great  pain  in  the  worst 
yeara  of  the  great  depression  to  B&L  debtors.4 
The  financial  reforms  of  the  New  Deal  changed  the  picture 
because  hooa+-owners  and  farmers  who  had  their  mortgages  scaled 
down  and  refinanced  by  the  federal  government’s  Home  Owners’  Loan 
Corporation  and  Farm  Loan  Corporation  were  all  put  on  contracts 
for  full  amortization  over  a  period  such  as  15  years. 
Building-and-loan  associations refloated  as  Federal  savings 
and  loan  associations  were  all  put  on  this  footing,  and  so  were 
most  of  the  surviving  state-chartered  institutions.  Federal 
mortgage  insurance,  written’on  scaled-down  loans  held  by  banks 
and  other  financial  institutions,  required  amortization,  as  did 
the  mortgage  inrruranca  provided  for  veterans  after  World  War  TX. 
Tradinc!  till 
In  the  1980’s,  while new  mortgage  contracts  continued  to 
call  for  amortization,  the  mortgage  debt  stzucturc  was  much 
weakened  by the practice  of  “trading  up”.  Think  of  a  home- 
owner  who  had  bought  a  house  for  $100,000  in  1975,  with  a 
4  Xembers  who  saved  through  a  building  and  loan  association 
did  JO by  acquiring  “shares”,  which  had  a  redemption  value  equal 
to  the  amount  paid  in,  and  which  paid  interest.  When  a  aaember 
took  out  a  mortgage with the association,  he  contracted  to 
pay  lntarest  on  the  mortgage  and  also  to  put  so  many  dollars  a 
month  into  pahareg,  which  were  not  redeemable.  When  the 
value  of  the  pledged  oharas  came  to  equal  the  value  of  the 
mortgage,  there  was  a  swap,  wiping  out  both  the’mortgage  and  the 
pledged  shares. 
If  the  association  became  insolvent,  the shortfall  02 the 
association’s  assets  against  its  share-liabiliti8s  was  spread 
over  both  pledged  and  unpledged 
the  shares  of  an  association  in 
cents  on  the  dollar,  a  borrower 
of  his  mortgage  would  find 
association’s  receiver  perhaps 
principal. 
shares.  So  if (for example)- 
liquidation  were  valued  at  50 
who  thought  he  had  paid  off  half 
that  he  still  had  to  pay  the 
three-quarters  of  the  original $90,000  mortgage  and  a  309year  arrrortlzation  schedule.  If  in  1980 
his  house  was  valued  at  $150,000  and  his  mortgage  balance  stood 
at  $88,000,  he  would  think  of  himself  as  having  an  equity  of 
rather  over  $60,000.  Since  meanwhile  he  -had  been  promoted  and 
his  wife  had  also  taken  a  paying  job,  he  and  his  wife  would  feel 
It  appropriate  to  trade  up  to  a  more  commodious  house  ,in  a  more 
agreeable  neighborhood,  appraised  at  $200,000. 
They  could  sell  the  old  house  for  $150,000,  buy  the  new 
house  for  $200,000  with  a  90%  mortgags (borrowing  $180,000)  and 
come  away  with  $130,000  in  cash. 
Some  of  this  cash  must  90  into  brokerage  and  perhaps  into 
“pointsw  on  tha  new  mortgage.  But the  remainder  could  readily 
buy  a new  car  and  new  furniture  to  match  the  new  house,  and  still 
leave  several  tans  of  thousands  to  put  into  a  mutual  fund  and 
rfde  the  stock  market,  Should  we  be  surprised  if  people  in  this 
situation  reckoned  the  real  estate  market  and  stock  market  were 
doing  their  saving  for  them,  and  felt  free  to  indulge  themselves 
as  consumers? 
The  same  game  could 
and  with  commercial  real 
seen  from  the  information 
unfortunate  Bank  of  New 
be  played  again  later  in  the  1980’s_- 
estate  as  we11  as  with  homes.  As  a#y  be 
in  the  press  In  recent  months  about  the 
England,  this  escalation  process  was 
stimulated  by  wildly  over-optimistic  appraisals  of  property.  As 
soon  as  overappraisals  had  cleared  the  track  for  a  few  purchases 
at  prices  well  above  the  values  real-estate  holders  had  placed 
upon  their  property,  these  transactions  became  part  of  the  record 
on  wfiich  less  starry-eyed  appraisers  would  advise  lenders  who 
were considering  fresh  mortgage  applications. 
A  real  estate  splurge  of  this  character,  responding  to  the 
upward  jump  of  petroleum  prices  at  the  time  of  the  “second  oil 
shock”  of  1979,  had  already  bloomed  and  withered  in  Texas  and  the 
southwest  before  it  had  got  very  fax  elsewhere.  nushrooming  S&L 
associations  supposedly  supervised  by  state  authorities  in  Texas 
12 wound  up  with  a  portfolio  of  what  were  often  “104%  martgagesW  on 
properties  whose  appraisals  had  been  pushed  sky-high  by  a  series 
of  semi-fictitious  transactions--  organized  within  clique%  made 
UP  of  irresponsible  real-estate  developers,  shady  construction 
companies,  mysterious  limited  partnerships,  and  irresponsible  S&L 
rnanagerrr.  Bss  ides  mortgages,  the  Texas  S&L’s  acquired  wildly 
over-valued  golf  courses  and  shopping  centers,  \  coIllfflercia1 
properties  (often  unfinished)  for  whom  no  occupants  were  in 
sight,  and  vacant  land. 
Late  in  the  1980’8,  regulatoxs  and  investigative  journalists 
began  to  scent  a  similar  pattern  in  California.  At  the  very  end 
of  the  decade,  it  began  to  be  realized  in  the  Northeast  that 
while  financial  corruption  was  much  lesr  of  a  factor  in  real 
estate  and  mortgage  dealings  than  in  the  Southwest,  there  still 
had  been  a  ma  jar  price  bubble.  Perceptions  of  real  estate 
“values”  faded.  Many  householda  and  business  enterprises  that 
wished  to  relocate  were  deterred  by  inability  to  find  buyers  at 
acceptable  prices  for  the  real  estate  they  already  held. 
‘Pa*  #I i  0  t 
In  such  metropolitan  areas  as  those  of  Boston  and  New  York, 
the  volume  of  sales  of  Hused  homes”  etc.  dropped  sharply,  and 
there  began  to  be  an  image  of  real  estate  “gridlock”.  Supposedly 
conservative  banks  turned  out  t.o  have  made  many  construction 
loans  on  projects  for  which  long-term  financing  had  not  been 
arranged,  and  sufficient  tenants  had  not  been  lined  up. 
The  curve  of  new  construction  and  remodeling  dropped 
sharply,  and  at  this  writing  seems  far  from  finding  a  bottom. 
Bank  examiners  and  appraisers  had  a  change  of  heart  toward  the 
end  of  1989,  and  were  perceived  by  many  (including  Treasury  and 
Federal  ReIerve  officials  In  Washington)  as  exerting  deflationary 
influence  through  excessive  caution. By  early  1990,  the  federal  Reconstruction  TrupJt  Company  was 
visibly  accumulatng  a  huge  inventory  of  foreclosed  properties 
and  mortgages  apt  to  default.  These  holdings  came  to  RTC through 
absorption  of  Wbadn  assets  of  S&L  associations  in  liquidation. 
RTC stood  ready  to  buy  such  assets  at  face  value  so  as  to 
persuade  acquirers  to  put  substantial  amounts  of  new  capital  into 
S&L’S  which  which  RTC had  taken  over  because  insolvency,  and 
which  RTC was  trylng  to  put  back  into  private  operation.  These 
RTC  real-estate  holdinqs  have  come  to  be  perceived  as  an 
“overhangm  which  threatens  reduced  occupancy  and  lower  realizable 
sale  prices  for  many  properties  whose  mortgages  had  been  regarded 
as  sound. 
Junk  bonds 
There  have  always  been  on  the  market  a  large  number  of  small 
issues  of  corporate  bonds  rsqarded  as  Wbelow  invcqtment  qrade”. 
Because  of  the  risk  that  debtors  might  default,  because  trust 
funds  etc.  have  bean  limited  to  winvestment  grade”  securities, 
and  because  few  potential  bondholders  knew  enough  about  the 
debtors  to  consider  them  seriously  as  investments,  the  market 
rates  of  yield  on  such  A  junk  bond”  securities  have  ruled  far 
abOV8  the  levels  for  investment-grade  bonds  rated  by  Standard  and 
Poors  and  other  rating  agencies  at  AAA,  AA  or  A. 
Sn  the  “leveraged  buyouts”  of  corporations  which  grew  to 
enormoub  proportion6  in  the  1980’s,  huge  additional  amounts  of 
bonds  have  been  emitted  by  operatnq  companies,  holding  companies, 
and  temporary  companies  set  up  to  handle  takeover  operationa. 
Though  lluny  specific  issue8  of  these  bonds  have  been  for  large 
amounts,  the  lack  of  substantial  collateral  and  the  risk  of 
default  by  issuing  companies  have  caused  them  to  be  set  up  with 
high  contractual  rates  of  interest,  and  the  term  “junk  bonds”  has come  to  mean  chiefly  such  takeover-issues.5, 
The  collapse  of  the  Penn  Square  bank  in  Oklahoma,  which  had 
originated  and  peddled  to  other  banks  a  hug+  amount  of  oil-based 
loans,  brought  down  the  Continental  Illinois  Bank  of  Chicago  in 
1982.  This  bank  was  given  a  shaky  second  incarnation  through  an 
enormous  investment  of  PDIC  funds  --  aimd  to  finance  the 
protection  not  only  of  insured  deposits  but  also  of  all  other 
liabilities  of  the  bank.  Since  this  precedent  was  set  by  the 
Federal  Reserve  and  FDIC!,  the  principle  of  “too  big  to  fail”  has 
been  a  major  element  in  official  financial  policy. 
III.  gvasive  finan- 
Within  the  structure  of  financial  layering,  the  layer 
devoted  to  intermediation  has  developed  a  tremendous  number  of 
what  may  be  called  Rpocketsn--  situations  where  a  single 
financial  operator  or  a  small  group  can  manipulate  a  whole  bundle 
5.  The  firm  of  Drexel,  Burnham,  which  MS  the  great  leader 
in  popularizing  and  marketing  these  bonds,  made  a  rather 
successful  effort  to  get  rid  of  the  unfortunate  connotations  of 
the  word  “junk”  and  transform  the  word  into  a  l-syllable  synonym 
for  “high-yielding”. 
A  curiosity  of  the  period  has  been  the  behavior  of  financial 
actors  and  observers  who  claim  to  believe  in  treating  market 
prices  as  the  only  measure  of  economic  avaluesn.  The  difference 
between  yields  on  junk  bonds  and  investment-grade  securities  is 
surely  the  market’s  measure  of  the  risk  that  issuers  of  junk 
bonds  may  default  or  get  involved  in  bankruptcy  proceedings,  or 
that  a  holder  who  needs  to  sell  sometime  in  the  future  may  be 
unable  to  find  a  buyer  except  at  distress  price. 
Nevertheless,  accounting  is  carried on as If junk-bond 
interest  constltutcs puze income,  rather  than  income-plus-a-rtsk- 
allowance.  Loss  reserves  for  jimk-bond  holdings  at  banks,  as I 
understand  a  rrth8r  murky  subject,  have  been  set  up  as  a  rule 
only  when  specific  issues  developed  conspicuous  special 
weaknesses,  rather  than  on  general  principles  for  junk-bond 
holdings  at  a  whole.  This  roof-never-leaks-when-it-doesn’t-rain 
philosophy  is  very  convenient  for  any  organization  which  wants 
to  exaggerate  its  current  income. of  ftnanctal  claims.  Creditorir  and  equity-holders  of  companies 
in  the  goods-and-services  economy  are  often  surprised,  to  find 
the  meaning  of  their  claims  transforarwd  beyond  recognition. 
A  precursor  of  this  situation  was  the  evolution  of  bank 
holding  companies,  which  first  came  into prominence  at  the end of 
the  1960's  .6  Bank  holding  companies  present  themselves  as 
organization8  for  bringing  fresh  capital  intQ  banks.  But they 
have  functioned  largely  to  take  capital  out  0-f. banks.  They 
acquire  virtually  1OOO  of  the  shares  in  the  banks  they  own 
(leaving  in  lnivtdual  hands  only  a  few  Wquallfying  shares*  for 
rfmnbers  of  the  bank’s  Board  of  Director8  1.  While  exchange  of 
6.  A  very  useful  compilation  of  data  on  these  companies  is 
published  in  the  Federal  Resezve’s  FLOW  OF FUNDS ACCOUNTS.  Wee 
Release  2.1,  which in  September  1990  carried  an  array  of 
Vinancial  Assets  and  Liabilities,  Year-End,  1966-1989". Under 
the head  of  “Domestic  Affiliates  of  Commercial Banks  (BWC’s)” 
(pp.  21-22  of the release), we find  a  balance-sheet  with  eight 
asset  entries  and  sight  liability  entries.  Apparently  these 
operations  were  an  innovation  (presumably  carried  on,  if  at  all, 
under  different  rubrics),  since the first entry in Release  2.1 
is  for  the  end  of  1968. 
Front  the  beginning  in  1968,  this  series  shows  BHC’s  as 
holding  two  principal  types  of  assets:  “Invcstmmt  in  bank 
subsidlariesw  and  nInvestment  in  finance  company  subsidiaries”. 
As  of  December  1989,  these  accountad  for  $202.4  and  $74.2 
billion,  out  of  “Total  financial  assctsW  of  $301.7 billion.  These 
assets  are  not debt clatms but book values of equity in the 
subsidiaries.  Identical  figures  appear  in  Release  2.1  as 
minvtstment  by  domestic  affiliates”  in  the  statement  on  "&met% 
and  Liabilities  of  U.S.-Chartered  Commercial  Banks”  (pp.  19-20  of 
the  release)  and  as  Rfunds  from  parent  companies”  in  the 
statement  for  Finance  Companies  (pp.  29-30). 
There  is  of  cou.rse  an  important  segsnent  of  U.S.  banking 
still in unit  banks  not owned  by  holdfng  conrpanies. As  of 
the end  of  1989,  the  “miscellaneous  liabilities"  of  8282.9 
billion  were  made  up  of the 8202.4  billion  of  holding-company 
equity  plus  $90.5  billion  of  notherw--  presumably  containing 
the  Dart  of bank  equity  m  owned  by  holding  cofapanies,  plU8  Some 
oddments. 
1C holding-company  shares  for  bank  shares  has  been  the  standard, 
part  of  the  payment  to  bank  stockholders  has  often  been  in  cash. 
Holding-companies  themselves  carry  credit-market  debts,  which 
account  for  a  substantial  fraction  of  their  holdings  in 
subsidiaries.  7 
Hvstification  about  ownership 
The  “pockets  n  referred  to  above  were  a  form  of  organization 
which  came  naturally  to  operator8  in  real  estate.  It  has  long 
been  a  widespread  practice  to  hold  title  to  a  building  or  a  piece 
of  land  through  a  company  with  an  unrevealing  name  and  a  non- 
specific  location--  so  as  to  make  it  easy  to  evade  complaints 
from  tenants  or  building  inspectors,  and  on  occasion  to  dodge 
taxes.  Each  operator  would  often  have  a  large  number  of  such 
coapanies. 
When real-estate  operators  began  to  deal  in  hundred-millions 
of  dollars,  this  practice  of  putting  assets  into  a  number  of 
pockets  continued  (though  in  late  years  large  operators  have  been 
boastful  rather  than  secretive  about  their  ownership  of  many 
subsidiaries).  Operators  who  focused  on  such  related  activities 
as  retailing,  and  those  in  more  abstruse  financial  activities, 
have  adopted  similar  patterns.8 
7  At  the  end  of  1989,  according  to  Release  Z.1,  holdlng- 
company  liabilities  for  Vredit  market  debt”  (corporate  bonds 
plus  commercial  paper)  was  equal  to  47%  of  the  total  financial 
assets  of  bank  holding  companies  (or  to  519  of  their  reported 
“investments  in  subsidiaries”. 
8  This  pattern  ha8  also  washed  back  into  banking.  One  of 
the  most  striking  financial  scandals  of  early  1991  has  been  the 
discovery  that  the  large&  commercial  bank  in  the  city  of 
washington  was  owned  (through  a  chain  of  pockets)  by  a mysterious 
group  of  men-without-a-country  much  interested  in  “laundering” 
the  proceeds  of  illicit  trade  in  drugs  and  weapons. 
In  this  case,  the  eminent  American  who  has  been  chairman  of 
the  board  at  the  bank  in  Washington  told  the  press  that  if 
anybody  had  been  injured  by  the  concealment  it  was  himself, 
because  he  had  been  deprived  of  his  “right  to  know”  who  the 
17 Users  of  pockets  often  find  It  convenient  to  seal  them  off 
from  each  other:  when  they  tun  into  financial  difficulties.  On 
occasion,  they  will  draw  upon  one  subsidiary  to  find  more  capital 
for  another.  This  is  common  where  the  difficulties  seem  to  be 
transitory  and  the  troubled  company  has  good  long-run  prospects. 
But  when  the  difficulties  seem  to  be  terminal,  the  operators 
often  prefer  to  let  the  troubled  company  default.  Then  the 
creditors  of  the  company  must  choose  between  writing  off  a  good 
part  of  their  claims  or  engaging  in  a  long  and  painful  struggle 
to  enforce  those  claims.  This  is  where  holders  of  junk  bonds  may 
find  they  have  bought  a  pocketful1  of  pesky  problems,  worthy  of 
analysis  by  Peter  Pasrell. 
gankrwtcv  threats 
To  ward  off  claims  of  creditors,  a  popular  dodge  these  days 
is  for  the  owners  of  a  subsidiary  to  take  it  into  bankruptcy 
court--  or  threaten  to  do  BO.  By  invoking  Chapter  XI  of  the 
Bankruptcy  Act,  a  debtor  company  obtains  Wprotectionn  pending 
reorganization  and  the  settlement  of  claims. 
In  this  context,  crcdltors  and  preferred  shareholders  have 
to  vork  through  committees,  which  are  cumbrous  and  often  seem  not 
very  representative  of  the  claimants  for  whom  they  speak.  If 
parent-company  claims  have  been  largely  paid  off  before  the 
crisis  becomes  visible,  or  if  the  parent  interests  contrive  to 
have  a  voice  through  committees,  not  only  junk-bond  holders  but 
suppliers  and  former  shareholders  who  have  taken  preferred  shares 
in  exchange  for  their  original  common shares  may  fare  badly. 
At  best,  if  they  fight, 
long  delay  and  heavy  legal 
owners  wertr  Odd1  One  would 
had  a  duty  to  know  about  the 
the  endangexed  claimants  must  face  a 
costs  to  get  their  entitlements.  A 
have  said  the  chairman  of  the  board 
ownership. 
18 threat  of  invoking  Chapter  XI  therefore  sets  the  stage  for  a 
negotiation  toward  an  namicablew  settlement--  in  which  perhaps 
the  existing  preferred  stock  will  evaporate  and  part  of  the  junk 
bonds  will  turn  into  a  new  issue  of  preferred  stock.  If  the 
market  values  junk bonds a  long way  below face  value,  one  can 
begin  to  see  the  reason  why.  \ 
IV.  Trouble  Sianals  in  Rsent  History 
Tracing  the  composition  of  assets  and  liabilities  of key 
sectors of the  economy  through  a  couple  of  recent  decades  can 
tell  us  a  good  deal  about  the  threat  presented  by  some  aspects 
of  the  debt  situation.  For  this  purpose,  I  offer  in’the  ANNEX 
a  set  of  tables  on  the  course  of  events  in  the  two  major  sectors 
of  the  U.S.  private  goods-and-services  economy--  the  household 
sector  and  the  corporate-non-financial  sector. 
Eofinfox.nra  t10 
The  data  underlying  these  tables  cow8  from  the  same  Federal 
Reserve  Board  release  that  ids  used  above  in  telation  to  holding 
companies.  9  The  original  series  of  curent-dollar  figures  are 
hard  to  use  because  they  carry  a  powerful  “trendW  resulting 
largely  from  the  rise  of  the  U.B.  price  level.  Yotal  financial 
asseta;”  in the  corporate  sector,  for  example,  stand  at  81982.7 
billion  at  the  end  of  1989--  7.3  tlmss  the  $272.7  billion  for 
9  Data  for  the  household  sector  appear  in  the  2.1  release 
on 
Flow  of  Funds  at  pages  S/6;  those  for  the  corporate  sector  at 
pages  9/10.  The  household  balance  sheet  presents  25  rows  of 
figures  on  flnanclal  assets  plus  12  rows  on  llabllitlee.  The 
corporate  balance sheet  presents  18  rows  on  assets  plus  19  rows 
on  liabilities. 
It  might  be  tempting  to  use  a  fuller  version  of  the  accounts 
(published  in  Federal  Reserve  Board  Release  C.9  of  October  1990, 
including  10  rows  of  data  on  “tangible  assetsw.  But 
unfortunately  the  basis  of  valuation  of  the  tangible  ;a;ets 
(which  are  lmpozted  from  a  study  of,  plx  d  Renrod  clble  Ta  q  bl. 
Wealth  in  the  United  States.  192W1985)  fs  so  arbkary  that  wee 
dare  rest  no  weight  upon  this  part  of  the  data. 
19 the  end  of  1966;  and  there  is  only  me  year  (1974)  where  the 
change  across  the  year  is  reported  as  negative. 
Since  we  want  to  look  at  debts  payable  and  receivable  in 
relation to each other,  I  have  stated  all  the  figures  as  ratios 
to  the  sector’s  total  outstanding  debt  (short-term  and  long-term 
combined).  The  results  are  rather  striking. 
Chanqen  in  tb  debt  uosition  of  households 
Looking  at  the  figures  for  debtorship  items  in  the  household 
sector  balance  sheet,  we  can  see  ,that  the  share  of  long-term 
mcredit-markct  instrumentsW  reached  d  high  for  the  1966/1989 
period  of  70.8%  of  total  debts  at  the  end  of  1989.  This  level  was 
reached  by  a  sudden  surge  starting from  6S.W  at  the end of  1985. 
It  maat  be  read  as  a  symptom  of  the  real-estate  situation 
sketched  above,  and  confirms  the  view  that  the  home-mortgage 
situation  may  be  ripe  foe  a  major  wave  of  defaults. 
The  f lgures  in  the  second  table--  far  household 
creditorship-items  which  are  short-tern  debts  receivable--  we 
find  at  the  end  of  1989  a  Z&year  high  ratio  of  32.0%  of  total 
household  debts  payable.  Between.  the 1985  level  of  28.9%  and  the 
1989  level,  there  was  a  trough  in  1986  of  26.71. 
It  is  a  curious  fact  that  tha  ratio  to  debts  payable  for 
“effective  money  stock”  moves  inversely  much  of  the time  to the 
ratio  for  short-term  receivables.  As  defined  here,  "effective 
money  stock”  includes  not  only  currency-and-demand-deposits  but 
also  time deposits  and  wshares”  in  money  market  mutual  funds  and 
in  other  mutual  funds  (which  commonly  provide  holders  with 
checkbooks  1.  Some  of  the  item  included  here  are  rather  close 
substitutes  for  item  included  in  short-term  debts  receivable. 
If  we  add,  together  these  two  groups,  they  show  for  the end  of 
1989  a  ratio  of  137.01;  perceptibly  but  not  dramatically  down 
from  the  ratio  of  145.6%  at  the  end  of  1984.  This  combined  ratio 
for  1984,was  the  highest  since  an  early  peak  in  1968. The  figures  just  cited  suggest  that  in  the  face  of  an 
unusually  heavy  load  of  mortgage  debt,  households  recently  have 
not  been  as  well;  provided  as  usual  with  fubds  they  could  readily 
use  for  mar  tgagq  reduction  or  for  real-estate  purchases.  It 
should  be  remarked,  however,  that  the  households  with  heavy 
mortgage  debts  are  not  necessarily  the  same  people  as  those  with 
strong  cash  positions.  In  fact,  it  is  likely  that  these  are  two 
distinct  groups,  with  a  rather  thin  in-between  group  who  hold 
moderate  mortgages  and  moderate  liquid  resources, 
\ 
The  ratio  to  debts  payable  for  “total  of  creditorship 
itemsn  shows  remarkable  stability  over  time.  Its  24-year 
high  wa8  246.7%  of  debts  payable  in  1983-e  rather  closely 
matched  with  peaks  of  245.6%  in  1969,  246.5%  in  1971,  243.8%  in 
1975,  and  244.6%  ln  1989,  Tbe  24-year  low  for  this  ratio 
was  218.08  in  1979. 
A  considerable  part  of  the  creditorship  of  households 
comes  from  assets  over  which  households  have  no  direct  control, 
and  which  are  specifically  locked  away  from  current  use.  These 
are  life  insurance  and  pension  fund  reserves,  lumped  together 
here  as  nindirect  holdings”.  The  residue  of  direct  holdings 
has  shown  a  downward  trend.  Its  peak  ratios  were  170.69  In  1968, 
163.6%  in  1976,  161.8%  in  1984,  It  dropped  in  every  year  8inca 
1984,  to  a  low  0f  156.0%  in  1989.  We should  note,  however,  that 
the  24-year  low  of  this  ratio  (146.3%)  came  earlier,  in  1979. 
Debt  bosition  of  non-financial  cornorations 
The  debt  position  of  non-financial  corporations  is  shown  in 
a  second  pair  of  tables.  on  the  side  of  debts-payable,  the 
structure  can  be  represented  very  simply.  For  long-term  debts 
there  is  a  simple  dominant  item:  corporate  bonds.  For  short-term 
debts  there  is  a  wider  scatter  of  W=s  (with  bank  loans 
amounting  to  over  half  the  short-term  total),  but  the  detail 
Seems  unilluminating  for  the  problems  in  hand.  Hence  the  table 
@its  the  debt  total  called  Wadit  market  instruments”  into only  two  components,  whose  shares  are thus  mirror-lmiges  of  each 
other, 
For  long-term  corporate  debt,  the  24-year  high  came  in  1967, 
with  a  ratio  to  total  debts  payable  of  66.79.  The  peak  in  the 
middle  of  the  period  was  at  the  same  level:  66.6%  in  1976.  But 
from  1976  onward,  the  long-term  share  declined  in  every  year  down 
to  1984,  when  it  reached  its  24-year  low  at  51.2%.  In  the  later 
1980’s,  there  was  a  continuous  rise  from  1984  to  a  new  high  in 
1988  on  56.2%.  (1989  showed  a  small  decline.) 
This  upward  movement  must  be  taken  to  show  the  effects  of 
the  large  issue  of  junk  bonds  in  connection  with  corporate 
takeovers.  We  must  remember,  too,  that  the  burden  of  debt 
includes  interest  charges,  and  that  the  interest  rates  on  junk 
bonds  are  vexy  much  higher  than  on  normal  corporate  bonds. 
On  the  expenditure  side,  the  table  carrier  one  more  column, 
sortinq  out  “effective  money  holdinqn  from  short-term  and  long- 
term  credit  market  instruments.  The  share  of  effective  money 
reached  its  24-year.peak  in  1982,  with  a  ratio  to  total  debts 
of  21.2%.  Since  reaching  a  secondary  peak  of  21.0%  in  1986,  it 
has  fallen  rather  sharply  to  17.4%  in  1989.  Earliar  troughs  were 
considerably  lower:  14.5%  in  1970,  35,4%  in  1976,  16.69  in  1979. 
For  short-term  credit-market  instruments  receivable,  as 
well,  there  was  a  peak  (6.7%)  in  1984,  followed  by  a  decline 
to  3.7%  at  the  end  of  1989.  It  we  combine  cash  and  short-term 
items,  we  find  a  24-year  high  of  27.9%  in  1983,  followed  by  a 
decline  to  a  24-year  low  of  21.19  in  1989. 
As  to  holdinqs  of  long-term  credit-market  instruments,  the 
24-year  peak  comes  at  the  outset:  at  the  end  of  1966,  6.5%  of 
total  debts  payable.  The  most  recent  peaks  have  been 
proportionately  much  lower:  4.18  in  1983,  3.9%  in  1986.  The  24- 
year  low  came  at  1.8%  in  1973,  while  1989  and  1985  show  lows  at 
3.28. 
22 For total  creditorship, the 24-year  peak  came fairly late: 
31.9% at the  end of  1983. From an interim peak of  29.69  in 1986, 
the ratio  dopped to 24.3%  at  the  end  of  1989. 
My  surmise about  the  data for  corporations  is that  the 
drastic  shifts  of  the  later  1980's  reflect  the  effect  of 
acquisitions  by  financial  bodies  which  are  treating  their 
operating  subsidiaries  as  "pocketsn.  If  we  &uld  trace 
relationships  within  groupa of  affiliates,  I would  guess,  we 
would  find  that  liquid  holdings  have  been  shifted  out  of 
operating companies in the goods-and-services  economy  into 
financially-oriented  holding companies. 
If the  adoptive  "parents" of the  operating companies could 
be relied upon to give support in case of need, the loss of 
liquidity for  non-financial  companies indicated by the data for 
the late 1980's  might make no  difference.  But  the  behavior  of 
operators  like Trump and Campeau suggests that they are  quite 
willing too let operating units go into bankruptcy rather than 
help them out from group headquarters.  Taking this factor into 
account,  along with the heavy interest  charge8 on  junk bonds, it 
seems fairly  clear  that  the  debt  position  of  non-financial 
corporations has weakened suddenly and  substantially  in  the  later 




DISPOSABLE PERSOrSAL  INCOM8 ANP PERSONAL SAWNO,  1929/1941: 
LEVELS, INCREWENTS AND RATIO  OP  INCXEMBNTS 
(Lavele,  and increments in billions of current dollars) 
--_____-__-_--w_  ---~_______~c_~_I_______I________ccII___~~*~~~~~~~~~~~ 
Year  Dispoaablc personal  Personal saving  Ratio: 
income 
PSD 
Actual  Base  IMlr8-  Actual  Base  Incre-  _-___ 
ment  ment  ’  DPD 
DPA  DPE  DQD  PSA  PSB  PSD 
___----I__________-__________l____l_____~~~__~_~~~~~~~~~~~_~~~~~~~~~~~ 
1930.  73.0  81.7  -8.7  1.9  2.6  -0.7  0.080 
1931.  62.9  73.0  -10.1  1.4  1.9  -0.5  0.050 
1932.  48.0  62.9  -14.9  -1.3  -::'3  -2.7  0.181 
1933.  44.9  48.0  -3.1  -1,6  -0.3  0,097 
1934.  51.6  44.9  6.7  -0.4  -1.6  1.2  0.179 
1935.  57.9  5A.6  6.3  -0.4  0.302 
1936.  65.8  57.9  7.9  x  1'::  0.190 
1937.  70.5  6S.8  1.7  2.9 
3:: 
-0.1  -0.021 
1938.  64.8  70.5  -5.7  -0.1  -3.0  O.S26 
1939.  69.7  64.8 
-X 
0.388 
1940.  75.0  69.7  ::3  :::  1.8  I'::  0.226 
1941.  91.9  75.0  16.9  10.0  3.0  7.0  a.414 
___----..s--___--  --_________________cc___________________--~~~~~~~~----- 
SOURCE: National Income and Product Accounts of  the United 8tat%a, 
1929-82, Table 2.1, page 88.  agh 4 Apzil 1991 
24 CODE 
CODES [for  all ratio tables1 
H’  :  Highest ratio  for  the variable in 1966/1989 
H:  High point: 
At  least 0.03 higher than adjacent L's or l's; 
At least 3 years in time away from  adjacent H's; 
h  r  Intermediate  high point (not  meeting conditions for H). 
-- I  Part-of continuous rise or fall. 
1:  Intermkdiats low point (not  meeting conditions for L). 
L  :  Low point: 
At  least 0.03 lower than adjacent H's or h's; 
At least 3.  years  in time away from adjacent t's; 
t* :  Lowest ratio for the variable in 196611989. 
25 RATIOS  OF‘  DBBTORSHIP  ITBJW TO TOTAL DBBTS PAYABLE, 
HOUSEHOLDS,  PERSONAL  TRUSTS AND NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS, 
1966/1909 
-----,_~_,----------,,,,-,,,-,,,,,,,-,-,---------~~---------~ 
Date  Credit-market  instrument8  :  Tax-exempt  :  Total  of 
-------------1-----------  debt  :  debtorship 
(Year  Short-term  Long-term  :  : 
-end)  :  ____w.-c---  :  _w_---- 
Ratio Code  .  Ratio Code  :  Ratio Code  :  Ratio 
1966.  0.337 L 
1967.  0.341  -- 
1968.  0.350 -- 
1969.  0.353 h 
1970.  0.351 1 
1971.  0.359  -- 
1972.  0.360 -- 
1973.  0.363 H* 
1974.  0.356 -- 
1975.  0.342 -- 
1976.  0.339 
1977.  0.335 -- 
1978.  0.333 -- 
1979.  0.326 -- 
1980.  0.315 -- 
1981.  0.313 L 
1982.  0.315 -- 
1983.  0.318 -- 
1984.  0.322 -- 
19a5.  0.327 h 
1986.  0.317 -- 
1987.  0,296 -- 
1988.  0.284 -- 
1989.  0.277 L* 
:  0.628  0.640 H  -- 
.  0.628 h 
.  0.617 -- 
:  0.617  0.611 L*  -- 
’  0.628 -- 
.  0.642 -- 
.  0.642 -- 
.  0.646 -- 
.  0.649 -- 
.  0.658 -- 
.  0.666 -- 
.  0.670 h 
:  0.650  0.660 
-- 
1 
.  0.659 -- 
.  0.687 -- 
0.699 --  . 
.  0.708 H" 
0.024 1  : 
0.031 --  : 
0.035 H*  : 
0.026 --  : 
0.021 1  : 
0.024 --  : 
0.029 h  : 
0.019 --  : 
0.016 --  t 
0.016  1  : 
0.019 --  : 
0.019 h  : 
0.018 --  : 
0.016 1  : 
0.019 h  : 
0.017 --  : 
0.018 --  : 
0.021 h  : 
0.018 1  : 
0.024 --  : 
0.024 h 
0.017 --  i 
0.016 --  : 
0.015 Lf  : 
























SOURCE:  Federal Reserve  Board Release  2.1 for September  1990 
pp. 9-10 
COMPDIBT 
26 RATIOS  OF' 
HOUSEHOLDS, 
CREDXTORSHIP  ITEMS TO TOTAL DEBTS PAYABLE, 
PERSONAL TRUSTS  AND NONPROFXT  INSTITUTXONS  , 
1966/1989 
wwwww-wwwwwwwwwwwwwcww  wwwwwwwwwwwwwwww-wwwwwwwwwwwwww-~~wwwwwwwwwww~--- 
Date  Effective  :  Credit-markat-instltu-  :  Indirect  :  Total  of 
money  :  tion creditorship  :  holdings  :  crcditor- 
stock  :  ___-_________c___-__~--  :  :  ship 
(Year  :  Short-term  .  Long-tern  :  :  items 
-end)  :  -----c--_-  . _____w___  __________  $ &_________ 
Ratio  Code  :  i  Ratio Code  Ratio Code  .  Ratio Code  .  :  Ratio Code 
--------------------__cc___I____________-~------------~~--------------- 
1966.  1.147 L  : 
1967. 1.210 --  : 
1968. 1.221 H  : 
1969. 1.146 L 
1970. 1.194 --  :: 
1971.  1.247 -- 
1972.  1.255 H*  i 
1973. 1.205 --  : 
1974, 1.192 L-  : 
197s. 1.234 --  : 
1976.  1.241 H  : 
1977. 1.186 -- 
1978. 1.125 --  i 
1979. 1.079 L 
1980. 1.095 --  i 
1981. 1.128 --  : 
1982. 1.177 --  : 
1983.  1.178 -- 
1984. 1.191 H  i 
1985. 1.142 L  : 
1986. 1.152 h  : 
1987. 1.110 -- 
1988. 1.070 --  i 
1989.  1.050 L*  f 
0.254 h 
0,247 -- 






















: 0.253  0.245 H  -- 
:  0.238  0.261 1  -- 
.  0.269 H* 
--  .  0.255 




: "0:::;  h 
-- 
:  “0%  H 
: 0.186  0.175 
-- 
-- 
.  0.160 1 
l  0.168 -- 
:  0.177  0.171 h  -- 




: 0.161  0.181 -- 
:  0.184  0,190 
-- 
H 
:  0.729  1  : 
: 0.751 H  : 
: 0.750 --  : 
:  0.734 1  : 
:  0.754 --  : 
: 0,767 --  : 
:  0.782 H  : 
: 0.719 --  : 
: 0.689 I,*  : 
: 0.783 H  : 
: 0.781  --  :  2.417 
:  0.735 --  :  2.297 
:  0.725 --  :  2.217 
:  0.717 L 
i 
2.180 L 
: 0.761 H  2.236 
: 0.759 1  2.263 
:  0.833  --  f  2.406 
:  0.872 H  :  2.467 H 
:  0.846  1  :  2.464 
1  0.857 h  :  2.449 
: 0.850  --  : 
:  0.838 1  : 
:  0.8SO --  : 















IXII*==PL*tlPf  f391t0301=L”==I=PPLt~~~~=~~~~~---===~=~~~~~~~~~=~=~~= 
SOURCB: Federal  Rssarve Board Release 2.1 for September  1990, 
pp g-10. 
27 RATIOS  OF  DEBTORSHIP  XTBW  TO  TOTAL  DEBT, 
NONFINANCIAL  CORPORATE  BUSINESS  (excluding farms), 
1966/1989 
~~~~~~~-~~~~~~~~~~~L---~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-~~~~~~~~~~~~---~~~~~~~ 
Date  Credit-market  instruments  payable  :  Total 
(year  ~~~~~~L----l~~~~~~~~~~~---~~~~~~~~~~---~  :  debtor- 
-end)  Short-term  :  Long-term  :  ship 
_w_..,---...-___  ____1_____---  _____cc----- 
Ratio  Code  :  Ratio  Code  :  Ratlo 
~~~~~~~~~--1~~~~~~~~--~~~~~~~~~~----~~~~~~~~~----~~~~~~~~~--------~~-~- 
1966.  0.334  h 
1967.  0.333  L* 
1968.  0.343  -_ 
1969.  0.367  H 
















1971.  0.346 
1972.  0.358 
1973.  0.361 
1974.  0.389 
1975.  0,348 
1 
-_ 
0.654  h 
0.642  _- 
0.639  c- 
0.611  L 



















1976.  0.334 
1977.  0.337 
1978.  0.346 
1979.  0.381 
1980.  0.401 


















1981.  0.430 
1982.  0.468 
1983.  0.469 
1984.  0.488 

















H*  L* 
-_  -_ 
1986.  0.460 
3.907.  0.439 
1988.  0.438 
















SOURCE:  Federal  Reserve  Board,  Release  2.1  of  September  1990, 
ppi  9-10. 
COFlPDEBT 
28 RATIOS  OF CRBDITORSHIP  ITEMS TO TOTAL DEBT, 
NONFINAWIAL  CORPORATIONS  (excluding  farms) 
196611989 
--c-m-  ---------------------------------~------~-~-~----------------- 
Data  Effective  f  Credit-market  :  Total credi- 
(year  mOn@y  :  instzuznent  holdings  .  :  tomhip 
-ens)  holding  :  ____~_____c_c__-___~~~~~~~  : 
Short-term  .  Long-term  : 
--__&__I__  :  ________---  .  _a________  :  -I-l-c------ 
Ratio Code  t  Ratio Code  .  Ratio  Code  :  Ratio  Code 
-_____________________________1_________~~~~~~~~~~-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
1966.  0.178  H 
1967.  0.175  -- 
1968.  0.170  -- 
1969.  0.160  -- 
1970.  0.145  t* 
1971.  0.146  -- 
1972,  0.152  *- 
1973.  0.168  H 
1974.  0.154  L 
197s.  0.165  -- 
1976.  0.169  h 
1977.  0.167  1 
1978.  0.174  h 
1979.  0.166  1 
1980.  0,189  W 
1981.  0.185  1 
1982.  0.205  -- 
1983.  0.212  H" 
1984.  0.197  1 
1985.  0.203  -- 
1986.  0.210  h 
1987.  0.197  -- 
1988,  0.182  -- 






h  0.065  H* 
0.048  -- 
0.048  -- 
0,031  -- 
0.028  L 
0.035  h 
0.030  -- 
0.018  L* 
0.020  -- 
0.035  -- 
0.035  h 
0.021  1 
0.022  -- 
0.022  -- 
0.027  h 
0.026  1 
0.035  -- 
0.041  h 
0.038  -- 
0.032  1 
0.039  h 
0.039  -- 
0.033  -- 













































O,-261  h 
0.259  -- 
0.243  1 






















0.267  1 
0.304  -- 
0.319  Hf 
0.297  -c 



















L*  L 
3~a=~==aa*w3~0~aawaa  I==~Ptt3t~sPI1IwIaP~~~ww~~~~~w~waa~~aww~~~~~~~s 
SOURCE:  Federal  Reserve Release Z,l for September  1990, pg.9/10 
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29 ADDCOW:  FINAL PAGES FOR  COMPDEBT  MS: PAPER FOR BARD,  4  APRIL 
V. QMNQINC? THE CONTEXT  OF FINANCE  WITH A  NAJOR NEW INDUSTRY 
As  I  Indicated  just  above,  the  whole  context  of  U.S. 
financial  policy  will  become  much  more  favorable  If  we  can set In 
motion  a  powerful  new  Industry.  The basis  for  such  a  new 
industry  is  somothlng  we  all  know--  but  which  looms  over  us  SO 
Immense  that  it  Is  hard  to  bring  into  focus: 
THERE 18 URGENT  NEED TO PUT THE U.S.INFRASTRUCTWRE 
IN GOOD ORDER  BY REPAIR, REPLACEMENT,  SUPPLEMENTARY 
CONSTRUCTKON  AND PROVISION  FOR MAINTENANCE.‘ 
A firm decision  by  the  United  States  government  to  move  rapidly 
In  this  direction  can  ward  off  the  risk  of  serfous  depression  or 
stagnation  and  remove  many  of  the  obstacles  to  financial  reform. 
To  avoid  mouthing  long  phrases  time  after  time,  I propose a one- 
word  name for  a program  to  this  end:  call  it INFRAHAB. 
The  infrastructure  backlog 
An  eStlraate  attributed  to  the  Asaociatcd  Contractors  of 
America  is  that  a  g-year  proqram  t.o  put the  infra&ructure 
in  good  order  entails  expenditures  of  $3.3 trillion.1  If we 
continue  along  present  lines,  Infrastructure  will  get  a  very 
small  fraction  of  this  amount--  particularly  since  state  and 
local  governments  are  under  budgetary  pressure  to  avoid  major 
construction  and  to  cut  back  mafntenance.  The  famous  bridge 
crisis  of  New York  Clty  will  serve  to  illustrate. 
I  In  the  midst  of  my work  to  frame  the  present  paper,  I  ran 
onto  this  citation  when  I took  half  an  hour  off  for  recreational 
reading  and  picked  up  the  gtlantic  Monthlv  for  April  1991.  It 
occurs  on  page  72  in  an  article  entitled  “Strong  but  Sensitive”, 
by  Yohn  Sedgwick-  The  focus  of  the  article  is  goncrate--  its 
history  and  its  very  promising  pospects. 
Another  citation  in  the  Sedgwick  article  Is  to  the  work  of 
Professor  David  Aschauar  of  Rates  college,  who  argues  that  there 
is  a  *strong  and  robust  link”  between  infrastructure  development 
and  the  growth  of  productivity.  InternatIonal  comparisons  sh0w 
that  if  we rank  majox  Industrial  cauntries  by  the  percent  of 
gross  product  going  into  infrastructure  and  by  the  rata  of  growth 
of gross product,  the  two  rankings come out essentially  the  same, 
and  with  very  similar 
30 It  might  be supposed  that  even  a  crash  program  for  INFRARAB 
would  do  little  to  strengthen  the  economy  in  the  early  1990’s. 
But  this  supposition  is  fallacious.  We should  remember  President 
Eisenhower’s  Highway  Trust  Fund  program  of  1954.  The  U.S.  economy 
was  suffering  a  severe  past-Korea  depression.  Tax  increases 
start  the  Trust  Fund  were  scheduled  to  start  at  once,  and 
expendltures  on  the’Interstate  Highway  System  to  start  after 
funds  had  been  accumulated.  Why did  we  get  a  rapid  recovery 




The  answer  is  toollnq  UD.  Every  construction  firm  which 
would  relish  road  contracts  needed  to  put  itself  in  shape  to  make 
acceptable  bids  by  getting  new  equipment,  reorganizing,  and 
devising  new  procedures.  Hence  private  capital  expenditure 
took  an  immediate  upward  jump.  A  similar  process  would  naturally 
be  set  going  by  INFRARAB. Some  suggestlons  as  to  the  form 
tooling-up  can  take  in  the  context  of  the  early  1990’s  are 
offered  below, 
E  Yte  r  L 
Infrastructure  is  of  course  owned  chiefly  by  government 
rather  than  by  the  private  sector  because  of  externalities. 
Sensible  allowance  for  these  externalities  should  be  a  central 
consideration  in  planning  INFRAHAR 
If  roads,  drainage  systems  and  the  like  were  owned  by 
private  parties,  a  large  part  of  the  benefita  they  qemrnte  would 
be  spread  out  to  non-owners  who  could  not  be  assessed  to  pay  for 
them,  and  thus  would  fall  to  enter  the  incentive-system  of  those 
who  decided  what  facilities  to  provide. 
The  value  of  the  externalities  from  Infrastructure 
facflities  does not depend only on the scale  of the services  fox 
whose sake they  axe  established  (and far which users  can  be 
constrained  to  pay).  Externalities  related  to  particular 
facilities  arise  largely  from  Incidental  flows  of services  and 
dla-services,  which  depend 
main  service#  the  location 
maintenance  is  conducted. 
on  the  technology  used  to  produce  the 
of  the  facilities,  and  the  way 
31 To a conslderablc  degree,  thsm  incidental  sbrvlc-  come  as 
d  surprirrc  to  the  authorities  that  run  the  Infrastructure  and/or 
to  the  general  public.  Some  of  these  surprises,,  howeVeX,  Would 
be  obviated  if  intelligent  use  were  made  of  expcricnce  at 
comparable  facilities  inside  and  outside  the  United  States.  And 
the cost of  surprises  could  be  abated  by  more  resourcefulness 
in  modifying  facilities  and  maintenance-patterns  as  experience 
accumulates. 
Broader  externalities 
The  strategy  and  tactics  of  INFRAHAB  should  take  dccOUnt 
also  of  a  set  of  still  broader  externalities,  In  recent;  years, 
for  example,  note  has  been  taken  of  the  noise-nuisance  arising 
from  the  way  highway  users  operate--  and  this  nuisance  is 
mitigated  by  making  “berms”  part  of  the  pattern  of  construction 
and  modernizat:ion. 
H  ain  8  ments  f  a  crash  Drocram  fez  INERU  lc  0 
The looming presence of the infrastructure  problem  means 
that  the  main  elements  of  an  XNFRAHAB  program  are  not far  from 
the  surface  in  many  people’s  minds. 
erw  tax.  The  first  question  people  ask  when  a  large  new 
spending  program  is  recommended is "where will we get the money?H 
For  INFRAHAB,  there is a ready  amwer  to this  question:  TAX THE 
USB OF PETROLEUM.  An  energy  tax of  the  magnitude  of  those  levied 
in  Europe  and  Japan  has  failed  of  adoption  in  this country  partly 
because  “it  would  actually  yield  too  much  revenue”,  partly 
because  the  common  sense  of a  use tax  comes  up  gainst  the 
protectionist impulse  toward  an  import  tax.  An  insufficiently 
understood consideration is that the  incidence  of either form of 
tax  would  be  in  good  part  (maybe  half?)  upon  the  overseas 
exporters:  because  we  refuse to pay taxes to ourselves,  we  in 
effect  pay  taxes  to  Arab  nabobs!  The  effect  of  the  tax  on  the 
intra-us  price  (at  a  guess,  of  the order of  half  the  per-gallon 
tax)  is  in  li_ne  with  the  objectives  of  INFRAHAB  because  it  will 
32 discourage  excess driving,  idling of motors.  neglect  of horn 
fnsulatlon  and  the  like--  all  factors  in  the  U.S.  economy  which 
carry  adverse  externalities. 
pcvival  of  rail  transoort.  Host  economists  seem  to  agree 
that  in  this  country  we  overuse  highway  transport  relative  to 
rail  transport.2  The  strategic  error  of  letting  highway 
transport  squeeze  out  rail  transport  has  doubtless  had  effects 
which  will  take  decades  to  rectify.  OUK locations  for  industrial 
Plants  and  for  transshipment  center5  are  far  too  heavily 
influenced  by  overuse  of  highway  transport.  By  pul\ing  these 
activities  out  of  cities,  incidentally,  we  have  made  Lt  harder  to 
develop  employment  where  it  ia  most  needed.  The  externalities  of 
railroad  transport  in  terms  of  noise  and  air  pollution  are  much 
more  favorable  than  those  of  trucking. 
A  peculiarity  of  our  transport  structure  is  that  rail  and 
air  transport  are  treated  as  competitors  rather  than  as 
complements.  Whereas  Zurich  has  an  airport  rail  terminal  and 
London  and  Paris  have  convenient  links  to  subway  systems,  'we 
force  our  airport  traffic  onto  overcrowded  motor  highways--  even 
though  railway  tracks  typically  run  within  a  few  miles  of 
airports.  Why can’t  we  be  sensible  and  let  Penn  Station  be  the 
place  where  we  check  in  ourselves  and  our  baggage  for  air  trips? 
The  case  for  mass  transport  of  people  by  “light  rail”  within 
metropolitan  areas  is  rather  well  understood  by  the  metropolitan 
public  and  rather  thoroughly  ignored  by  others.  But  more  use  of 
experience  elsewhere  might  help.  For  example,  such  metro  systems 
as  those  of  London  and  Paris  include  ring  lines  so  that  not  all 
trips  need  pass  through  the  center.  And  some  one  of  the 
effective  fare-collection  systems  which  work  elsewhere  in  the 
world should work also  In New York. Do  we  really  have the world's 
most  resourceful  transit-cheaters  in  the  world’s  cultural  hub,  or 
have  we  missed  some  bets? 
2  One  suspects  that  Lf  David  Aschnuer  had  ranked  countries 
in  order  of  their  use  of  rail  transport  for  goods,  he  would  have 
found  another  rank  ordering  parallel  to  those  for  productivity 
growth  and  for  infrastructure  expenditure. 
33 pisDosa1  facilities.  xt  is  widely  realized  that  our  country 
has  disastrous  failures  in  the  way  we  handle  our  voluminous 
M8ttiS.  our  USC  of  nuclear  energy has rested  on  a  promise  (never 
fulfilled  despite  serious  efforts)  that  we  will  develop 
permanently  safe  disposal  of  nuclear  wastes.  Pexhap.s.  there  are 
remedies  in  some  of  the  reported  success-stories  from  other  parts 
of  the  world;  but  one  notes  that  the  canny  Swedes  have  given  up. 
Development  of  energy  sources  without  disposal  problems  (nuclear 
fusion?  capture  of  solar  radiation  outside  the  atmosphere?)  is 
so  urgent  that efforts  in  this  direction  clearly  beloncj  in 
I NFRARAR  . 
Recycling  of  ordinary  rubbish  has  become  a  matter  of 
universal  lip-service,  if  not  yet  much  of  a  reality.  Sorting, 
reuse  of  metals,  plastics  I  glass  and  paper  and  high-temperature 
incineration  all  seem  useful--  but  only  as  ways to slow down 
our  burial-in-trash,  not  yet  to  stop  ft.  Most  economists  would 
probably  agree  that  more  use  of  taxes  to  reduce  the  generation  of 
pre-rubbishy  products  and  shift  to  more  durable articles  made 
from  less  trashy  materials  will  be  good  public  policy. 
Resources  for  Doaitive  measures  .  The  available  resources  in 
manpower,  facilities  and  physical  materials  for  an  IWRAHAB 
program  are  enormous--  much  greater,  I  would  opine,  than  most 
economists  think.  And  the  externalities  of  their  transfer  from 
present  u8es  can  be  invaluable. 
To  a  very  large  extent,  the  actual  infrastructure  needed 
for  INFRAHAB is low-tech--  entailing installation  of  fresh 
concrete,  rust  removal,  etc.  But high-tech equipment and 
procedures  will  be  needed  to do a  good  job  of installation. 
And the design and application  of sy&teme to make sure  the 
installation  is  without  serious  flaws  is  a  hiigh-tech  job* 
The  role  of  hish-tech  industries.  The  companies  which 
produce  weapons  are  well  qualifted  to  produce  the  sophisticated 
equipment  which  INFRAHAR  will  require.  There will  be  problems, 
34 for  example,  of  keeping  bridges  usable  by  supporting  their  load 
when  work  is  going  on  to  restore  their  underpinnings  and  their 
supporting  members.  This  is  a  job  for  heavy  equipment  designed  to 
ho  knocked  down and  moved  on  to  another  job,  and  to  adapt  to  a 
variety  of  situations.  Similar  but  distinct  problems  will  arise 
when  it  is  urgent  to  keep  buildings  usable  while  work  goes  on 
underneath  them  to  restore  infzastructure. 
It  appears  that  successful  hardening  of  concrete  can  be 
furthered  by  running  weak  electric  currents  through  their 
metal  reinforcing  members.  Monitoring  devices  will  be  ,needed 
to  aasurt  that  concrete  is  of  the  right  consistency  for  its 
use,  and  that  it  is  properly  compacted  as  it  is  poured.  If  salt 
still  has  to  be  used  for  de-icing,  special  members  must  be 
devised,  adapted  and  installed  to  direct  to  salt  to  places 
where  it  can  do  no  damage.  (With  ingenuity,  perhaps  salt-runoff 
can  be  collected,  recycled  and  reused.) 
INFRAHAB thus  offers  ways  for  arms-producing  companies 
to  use  their  resources  for  products  with  strong  markets  for 
which  high-tech  companies  have  a  natural  advantage. Besides, 
manpower  with  just  the  right  qualifications  to  oversee  the 
proper  installation  of  new infrastructure  can  be  released 
from  the  labor  force  of  the  arms  industries--  and  from 
the  armed  forces,  where  the  Gulf  war  showed  that  the 
forces  had  been  very  successful  in  training  people  for 
close  cooperation  and  precisa  work. 
Overseas-trade  conseauenceg. 
The  combined  effect  of  the  various  sub-programs  seem  likely 
to  ease  the  foreign-trade  position  of  the  United  States. 
1)  Arms  exports  can  and  must  be  sharply  reduced.  The 
reduction  of  these  exports  offers  the only escape 
in sight from an  ugly  spiral? 
35 (a)  In  order  to  keep  the  arms  industry  active,  the 
United  States  government  makes  grants  to 
Israel--  with  the  effect  that 
(b)  Israel  can  pay  for  desired  high-tech  U.5  arms-- 
with  the  effect  that 
.(c)  Jealous  Arab  neighbors  buy  similar  arms  to  outdo 
Israel--  with  the  effect  that 
(d)  Israel  fears  being  outmatched  and  seeks  US 
grant8  --  with  the  effect  that 
We are  back  again  to  (a)! 
The  result  of  this  spiral  is  to  make  a  Middle  East 
war  more  dangerous  to  the  world  if  it  happens,  and  also 
to  increase  the  likelihood  that  it  will  happen. 
Another  such  spiral  exiats  in  the  tension  between 
India  and  Pakistan.  A  third  my  exist  in  Africa. 
High-tech  arms  exports  to  Latin  America  also  must 
do  a  lot  more  harm  than  good,  though  fts  dynamics  differ 
from  those  of  the  Middle  East  spiral.  All  the  major  Latin 
American  countries  (and  almost  all  of  the  middle-sized 
ones)  have  long  had  the  good  sense  to  avoid  war  with  each 
other.  But  the  demand  for  high-tech  arms  has  continued, 
though  it  is  hard  to  see  how  Latin  American  governments 
could  use  them  except  against  their  own  people.  There  are 
some  indications  of  Internal+  arms  races  in  Latin  American 
countries,  with  each  branch  of  the  armed  services  trying 
to  outshine  the  others.  In  any  case,  the  U.S.  resources 
devoted  to  producing  theac  ita=  art  doing  Latin  America 
and  the  United  States  less  than  no  good. 
2)  With  a  lower  quantum  at  lower  (before-tax)  prices, 
the  cost  of  our  011  imports  should  fall  considerably. 
35 3) Countries  which now are arms buyers will (one  hopes) 
becoxne  buyers  of U.S. machinery. 
4) The apparently favorable  net effect on the  U.S. 
current-account  balance will have to be obviated in the 
not-too-long  run by a rise in the foreign-exchange  value 
of the dollar. 
prosoects for the U.S. financial  system 
The effect of these changes should considerably reduce the 
financial tensions of the U.S. economy.  The foreiqn&xchange 
position should make lower interest  rates tenable, wit,h  a 
favorable effect on  U.S.  asset values. 
Given  these changes in the context, U.S. corporations will 
be enabled to ease their  debt  positian by selling equity and 
buying back debt. The counterpart of this movement will be 
willingness of  U.S.  households  and pension funds to hold  a  larger 
slice of their portfolio  assets  in  equity rather than in debts 
receivable. 
Oil tax revenue  and the lowering of Treasury interest costs 
will enable the federal  government to buy back some of its debt, 
and to give a financial  lfft to state and local governments 
(which  also will have reduced interest  costs). 
To what extent the changed situation will enable debtor 
companies to clear away their junk-bond  debt may be more 
debatable.  But with a strong lift to the economy in sight for 
several years ahead from INFRAHAB,  corporations and 
unincorporated business  will be more interested in R&D and in 
fixed investment.  Motives to save in  order  to  Invest  will  be 
intensified for both branches of  business, and the capital needs 
of unincorporated  business  should generate additional saving by 
households. 
37 prosaect~  for  basic  financial  reform. 
Aa  I  sea  it,  this  change  in  the  situation  will  also  smooth 
the  path  for  what  I  would  call  basic  financial  reform.  By  this  I 
mean: 
Al  A  shift  in  the  standards  of  good  management  from 
efficiency  in  exploiting  or  creating  tax 
loopholes8  to  efficiency  in  running  goods- 
and-services  operations.  This  requires  major 
changes  in  the  content  of  tax  legislation 
and  also  in  the  way  tax  legislation  is 
concocted. 
B)  Closing  down  the  financial-loophole  fact&y  in 
Washington  and  in  state  capitals.  This 
may  not  be  feasible  without  basic  electoral 
reform. 
Cl  A  cleanup  of  the  MpocketsW  of  financial 
manipulation  about  which  I  complained  above, 
and  in  general  of  the  powers  and 
responsibilities  of  holding  companies. 
D)  A  reduction  of  the  over-liquidity  of.households. 
E)  Termination  of  Wtoo-big-to-failm  protection  except 
for  banks  (and  perhaps  other,  financial 
institutions)  which  sign  and  fulfil  contracts 
under  which  they  will  rapidly  build  up  authentic 
capital  to  a  level  where  deposit  insurance  is 
superfluous. 
F)  Curing  the  discrbuination  in  favor  of  undue  risk 
which  results  from  the  combination  of  deposit 
insurance  with  accounting  rules  which  permit 
treating  hypothetical  future  profits  as  actual 
current  profits.3 
3  I  do  not  insist  that  everybody  adopt  a  standard  of  “mark 
to  marketm,  which  can  have  serious  drawbacks  if  it  is  not 
feasible  to  hold  interest  rates  within  narrow  bounds.  But  theze 
should  be  a  system  of  sgacial  reserves  which  will  impound  the 
eXM,ss  of  contractual  interest  over  Investment-grade  interest 
until+aS%&$  like  junk  bonds  are  either  redeemed  or  sold  on  the 
‘. 
-..  . . 
38 0)  Restoring  and  maintaining  the  professional  integrity 
of  auditors,  loan  officers  and  bank  executives, 
appraisers  and  bank  supervisors  at  all  levels. 
WI  Curing  the  perverse  incentives  of  police-makers_ 
which  arise  from  trying  to  restore  confidence 
by  telling  the  public  that  the  true  facts  are 
too  disturbing  to  elucidate.  Such  behavior  at 
the  top  breeds  fnsincerity  all  up  and  down  the 
line  of  financial  regulation,  and  contributes  to 
the  public’s  general  loss  of  confidence  in 
national  leadership. 
market. 
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